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I’m not original. My ideal is the creative mind, or, in 
terms of mottoes: IBM’s “Think” and the poetic “never 
a day without a line.”
—A. P. Ershov
When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985, the Soviet Union was 
suddenly confronted with two major, imminent transformations. The first 
was the restructuring and liberalization of Soviet society under the banner 
o f glasnost' and free market reform, the subject o f the most influential 
studies o f the late Soviet era, which depict the break of the early perestroika 
years primarily in ideological or personal terms.* 1 The second, in a longer 
timeframe, was the arrival o f the post-Fordist information economy, heralded 
in part by the worldwide explosion in personal computing over the course of 
the decade. Although it has received little attention, the plan to modernize 
and retool the Soviet economy using advanced scientific and technological 
means was integral to Gorbachev’s promise. If the Soviet Union was to 
present an effective counterpart to the “capitalism of the age o f electronics 
and informatics, o f computers and robots”—as he put it in his address to 
the 27th Party Congress—it needed to turn the “acceleration of scientific- 
technical progress” to its advantage, making the most o f the “transformation
I would like to thank Loren Graham, Terry Martin, Rachel Koroloff, and Kritikas anonymous 
reviewers for their comments on previous versions of this essay.
1 See Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005); Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon Averted 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); and Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1996); but compare Jerry Hough, Democratization and Revolution in 
the USSR, 1985-1991 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 22—60.
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o f consciousness” and the “new psychology” it would bring.2 This approach 
implied a number o f concrete tasks, among which “securing the computer 
literacy o f students” was “especially urgent.”3 In fact, Gorbachev had pushed 
through a mass computer literacy campaign in 1985, even before the death 
o f Chernenko.
Andrei Petrovich Ershov, a 53-year-old academician and computer 
programmer, took command of the project from the very beginning. He 
was already known throughout the programming community on both sides 
o f the Iron Curtain for his visionary views on the transformative power of 
mass computing, and he had risen to prominence in the Academy of Sciences 
partly as a result o f his international network o f contacts. In the party journal 
Kommunist, Ershov made a powerful case for the centrality o f“informatization” 
to the perestroika project: the expansion of personal computing, guided 
and pushed forward by the Soviet educational system, promised not only 
the “democratization of the information structure o f society” but a dramatic 
society-wide shift toward private initiative at the expense o f bureaucracy. 
Ershov thus proposed a single solution to the twin challenges o f the 1980s. 
Universal computer literacy was to be a worthy successor to the grandest of 
Soviet enterprises—electrification, collectivization, and industrialization.4
By the time the Soviet Union ceased to exist in 1991, the computer literacy 
campaign had collapsed utterly, squandering widespread initial interest in the 
subject. Today, the millions o f students who once used Ershov’s textbooks 
remember it as a late Soviet absurdity. How did this gifted programmer, 
whose writings on computer literacy had been widely publicized at home 
and abroad, fail so completely at turning his ideas into reality? It was not, I 
argue, merely the unpropitious conditions o f an imploding system that led 
to the reform’s collapse. Its origins lay instead in a persistent set o f ideals 
formulated within the post-Stalin scientific community and rearticulated 
through contemporary debates on cybernetics and the correspondence 
networks o f international computer science. These ideals provided confident, 
affirmative answers to questions that had become unusually potent as the 
postwar years made science more massive, popular, and public, in the Soviet 
Union as well as elsewhere: Could scientific life provide a blueprint for 
human flourishing? Could science be made to serve moral and social, as well 234
2 M. S. Gorbachev, “Politicheskii doklad Tsentralnogo komiteta KPSS XXVII s'ezdu,” in 
Izbrannye rechi i stat'i (Moscow: Politizdat, 1987), 3:180—286. All translations mine except 
where noted.
3 Ibid., 229.
4 A. P Ershov, “Informatizatsiia: Ot komp iuternoi gramotnosti uchashchikhsia k 
informatsionnoi kul ture obshchestva,” in Izbrannye trudy (Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1994), 371— 
84 (originally published in Kommunist 1988, no. 2).
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as technical, ends? Much of this heritage—the utopian appeal o f science in 
the public imagination—was shared by the Gorbachev project more broadly; 
after all, “the acceleration o f scientific-technical progress” had been one of the 
cardinal slogans o f the 22nd Party Congress o f 1961, long before Gorbachev 
made uskorenie a keystone of perestroika.5 Ershov’s career as a scientific 
reformer offers us an alternate vision of a perestroika based on scientific and 
technological transformation—and explains why such visions nevertheless left 
the Soviet Union unprepared for the information age.
Like Gorbachev, Ershov began his career during the years immediately 
surrounding the death of stalin. As a student, Ershov had initially planned 
on becoming a physicist, but stalin-era restrictions forced him to turn 
to mathematics instead. He graduated from Moscow State University’s 
Department o f Computational Mathematics in 1954, among the first classes 
to receive a degree in programming. For the next three years, he worked as 
a graduate student under Aleksei Liapunov—a leading Soviet mathematician 
and a prominent figure in the emerging field o f cybernetics—before being 
assigned to head his own laboratory in Novosibirsk’s “Akademgorodok,” then 
still under construction.6 He was thus, at the age o f 28, already on his way to 
becoming a full-fledged member o f the Soviet scientific establishment.
In the postwar era, this career path had great potential. Recent scholarship 
on the history o f Soviet science has shown how the Cold War allowed scientists 
to accumulate tremendous social and institutional power, especially in the 
upper tiers o f the Academy of Sciences hierarchy; Akademgorodok itself was 
a massive monument to the state’s commitment to supporting both basic 
and applied research. Individual scientists could often influence government 
policy and even foreign relations. Matthew Evangelista’s Unarmed Forces, to 
take only one example, demonstrates the ability ofhighly placed scientists such 
as Evgenii velikhov to translate their authority as scientists into substantive 
political change—in Velikhov’s case, the struggle against nuclear weapons.7
5 XXII s "ezd Rommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza: Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow: 
Politizdat, 1962), 282.
6 See Irina Kraineva, “Nauchnaia biografiia A. P. Ershova” (Candidate’s diss., Tomsk 
University, 2008). The definitive study of Akademgorodok is Paul Josephson, New Atlantis 
Revisited: Akademgorodok, the Siberian City of Science (Princeton, N J : Princeton University 
Press, 1997).
7 Matthew Evangelista, Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999); Nikolai Krementsov, Stalinist Science (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997); David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb (New Haven:
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Several decades later, in attempting to translate his educational ideas into 
reality, Ershov would benefit from the same effect.
Developing as a scientist in the 1950s also meant participating in a vibrant 
and burgeoning new scientific culture, shaped by cybernetics and computer 
technology and confident in the ability o f the exact sciences, given sufficient 
energy and devotion, to effect personal, aesthetic, and social change.8 As in the 
prewar world o f amateur rocket enthusiasts described by Asif Siddiqi in The Red 
Rockets’ Glare, this fascination with the possibilities o f science spilled over into 
popular culture, creating a rush of widely read science fiction novels, popular- 
scientific periodicals, and other media. One of the best-known products o f this 
vogue, Arkadii and Boris Strugatskii’s gently satirical Monday Begins on Saturday, 
is set in a research institute populated by characters from Russian folklore and 
stars a computer programmer as its main character; the title refers unironically 
to the characters’ 24/7 dedication to their work.9 As Benjamin Nathans has 
argued for Aleksandr Vol'pin, immersion in this culture could mean taking 
it to its logical conclusion and using the “exact methods” o f cybernetics as a 
blueprint for political engagement.10 Ershov never became a dissident—or, like 
Gorbachev, a political reformer—yet his experience during the Thaw shaped his 
confidence in the power o f science and technology to transform society.
Ershov’s early career formed his vision of an ideal working programmer: 
confident, independent, and consummately professional yet also endowed 
with a rigorous and methodical mind. As a young working scientist whose 
Monday really did begin on Saturday, he felt its influence professionally as 
well: he came to value a kind o f heroic individualism and selfless dedication 
to science above all else. His diary, which he kept on a semicontinuous basis 
from 1958 to 1964, records dramatic leadership conflicts with Liapunov and 
other colleagues in which personal and professional matters became hopelessly 
muddled.11 Personal life was seen to represent an impingement on professional 8910
Yale University Press, 1994). See also Jeffrey Roberg, Soviet Science under Control (London: 
Macmillan, 1998).
8 The most comprehensive study of the productive intersections among science, ideology, 
and Soviet life is still Loren Graham, Science, Technology, and Human Behavior in the Soviet 
Union (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987)
9 Asif Siddiqi, The Red Rockets’ Glare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Loren 
Graham, ed., Science and the Soviet Social Order (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1990); Arkadii and Boris Strugatskii, Ponedel'nik nachinaetsia vsubbotu (Moscow: Tekst, 1992 
[1964]).
10 Benjamin Nathans, “The Dictatorship of Reason: Aleksandr Vol'pin and the Idea of Rights 
under ‘Developed Socialism,’ ” Slavic Review 66, 4 (2007): 630—63.
11 Arkhiv akademika A. P. Ershova (hereafter EA) f. 35, pp. 121, 124. (Here and below, all 
Ershov Archive materials are cited by folder and page number rather than URL; they are 
accessible from http://ershov.iis.nsk.su/archive/eaimage.asp.)
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responsibilities, leaving women particularly vulnerable to criticism. Ershov’s 
recommendation letters from this period invariably value independence, 
initiative, and “goal-orientedness” while less glowing recommendations carry 
notes like “because o f a certain lack o f activity, works best within a small 
group” and “she could benefit from more independence and energy ... [she] 
would work best as a coder in a two-person group with a stronger associate.”12 
At one point, over the course o f six months, Ershov logged a series o f dry 
and rather negative conversations with a female subordinate about unfinished 
programming work, terminating simply with the line “Gave birth to a son!”13 
It was around this time, too, that Ershov developed a set o f obsessive 
notetaking and recording practices and began accumulating the nucleus of 
his massive personal archive, a preoccupation with organizing information 
that was reflected in similar demands he placed on his colleagues. They 
recalled that “ [o]n every page—whether it was a draft o f an article, a letter 
to a party organization, or a poem about his experiences on the road—there 
was always a record (instead o f a page number) in the top corner: the date, 
the hour and minute, and place. . A few business trips with Ershov were 
enough to make this style o f work, including both the absence o f comfort 
and the accurate documentation o f work materials, a conscious legacy.”14 His 
first major project was rigorously mapped out in a series o f brainstorming and 
project notebooks (the latter known collectively as the “Talmud”), to which 
every member o f the team was expected to contribute. Reminders litter the 
pages: “This engaging chronicle [letopis'\ lacks synchroimpulses. Put down 
the date and hour with every new note. A. Ershov.” 15
One o f the first entries in Ershov’s diary records the visit o f a group of 
American computer scientists to Moscow, where he was working as a graduate 12345
12 EA f. 365, pp. 1-48.
13 EA f. 35, pp. 1-91.
14 Iu. A. Pervin, “Ershov i Slovo,” in Andrei Petrovich Ershov: üchenyi i chelovek, ed. A. G. 
Marchuk (Novosibirsk: Rossiiskaia akademiia nauk, Sibirskoe otdelenie, 2006), 329—36. 
This edited volume is one of a number o f primary and secondary works on Ershov produced 
under the aegis of his institute, which are valuable sources despite their tendency toward 
hagiography. See Kraineva, “Nauchnaia biografiia”; I. V. Pottosin, ed., Novosibirskaia shkola 
programmirovaniia (pereklichka vremen) (Novosibirsk: Institut sistem informatiki imeni A. P 
Ershova, 2004); Pottosin, ed., Stanovlenie Novosibirskoi shkoly programmirovaniia (mozaika 
vospominanii) (Novosibirsk: Institut sistem informatiki imeni A. P. Ershova, 2001); B. G. 
Mikhailenko, ed., Institut vychislitel'noi matematiki i matematicheskoi geofiziki (VTs)  SO RAN: 
Stranitsy istorii (Novosibirsk: Geo, 2008).
15 A. P. Ershov, “ Al fa-rozhdenie,’ ili kak sozdavalas' sistema avtomaticheskogo 
programmirovaniia,” in A. P. Ershov: Uchenyi i chelovek, 17—31; I. V. Pottosin, “Istoriia Al fa- 
proekta,” in Stanovleniie Novosibirskoi shkoly programmirovaniia, 46—55; N. L. Cheremnykh, 
“Arkhiv akademika A. P. Ershova,” in Novosibirskaia shkola programmirovaniia, 20—25; EA f. 
19, 22, 23.
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student at the Computing Center o f the U SSR Academy of Sciences. Prior 
to the visit, Ershov was skeptical that the encounter would be productive: 
“An interesting note in the Comm. o f the ACM  (no. 5. vol. 1, 1958) about 
the development o f automatic programming at Remington Rand. As far
as I could understand, it’s the same thing [we’re doing]__ Already almost
convinced: I won’t hear any new ideas from the Americans.” When the 
Americans did arrive, he found them “welcoming, friendly, and reasonably 
earnest. But it must be said that we had no ‘acute’ [politically sensitive] 
conversations.” As they left, one o f them, John W  Carr III, told Ershov to 
keep in touch, which left the Soviet programmer flattered and impressed. The 
parting was “very heartfelt.”16 For their part, Carr and his American colleagues 
noted “the continuing interest o f the entire Soviet population in cybernetics” 
and predicted that “ [d]espite a relative slow start, and mainly because o f the 
flexibility o f their mathematical leadership, Soviet use o f computers may be 
expected to surpass in quality and quantity that o f the United States.”17
The visit also had a more concrete effect for Ershov: from conversations 
with the Americans, he learned about their work on achieving machine 
independence—that is, the development o f programming languages not 
tied to a specific computer architecture. Out o f this came an idea o f a new 
machine-independent programming language, which was eventually adapted 
to the syntax o f ALGO L (a new language developed in part by Alan Perlis, 
who was among the group o f visiting Americans) and eventually called 
ALPHA. Ershov’s work on the “ALPHA-translator”—a pathbreaking early 
optimizing compiler for the language—was the mainstay o f his career for the 
next decade, especially after he definitively relocated to Akademgorodok.18 
Ershov was thus indebted for his professional success not just to his role in an 
indigenous Soviet scientific community, but also to his contacts with a then- 
nascent international one.
Ershov had consistently given credit for the “fermentation of ideas” about 
ALPHA to Western programmers through both the initial conversation with
16 EA f. 35, pp. 100—3. Emphasis in orig.
17 John W. Carr III et al., “A Visit to Computation Centers in the Soviet Union,” 
Communications of the ACM  2, no. 6 (1959): 8—20.
18 Kraineva, “Nauchnaia biografiia,” 53—60. For the early terminology of “automatic 
programming,” see John Backus, “Programming in America in the 1950s—Some Personal 
Impressions,” in A History of Computing in the Twentieth Century, ed. N . Metropolis et al. 
(New York: Academic Press, 1980), 125—35. A compiler, in contemporary usage, is a program 
that converts text written in a human-readable programming language into machine code that 
can be interpreted directly by a computer. An optimizing compiler is supposed to generate 
machine code that is more efficient (for instance, in memory or CPU usage) than the hand- 
coded equivalent.
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the visiting Americans and other materials published abroad. After the meeting 
in 1958, as he put it, the “research and projects o f Soviet scientists became 
woven into the common fabric o f the development o f programming.”19 
Unsurprisingly, his foreign contacts did not end there. As he moved upward 
on his career trajectory over the course o f the 1960s and 1970s, he maintained 
a broad and extensive correspondence with computer scientists in America, 
Western Europe, and Japan and participated in a number o f international 
organizations, such as the International Federation for Information Processing 
(IFIP) and the Association for Computing Machinery. These bodies, as well 
as the artificial intelligence (AI) researchers John McCarthy and Edward 
Feigenbaum (both frequent correspondents o f Ershov’s), have received 
considerable scholarly attention because o f their ambivalent relationship to 
the Cold War.20 Paul Edwards’s The ClosedWorld, in particular, has singled out 
McCarthy and Feigenbaum’s contributions to military-funded AI research. In 
Edwards’s view, this branch of early computer culture played a fundamental 
role in the ideological construction of a self-enclosed, predictable, and 
rule-governed “closed world” which could be defended and controlled by 
planetary-scale, computerized military technologies—a vision that helped 
sell the American public on massive funding for computers as well as an 
expanding defense establishment.21
Even as both soviet and American scientists made use o f Cold War tensions 
to enhance their personal and professional authority, in their exchanges with 
one another they attempted to find ways o f overcoming and circumventing 
geopolitical barriers in the service o f a vaguely defined “common task of 
science,” as Ershov put it in a letter to the Japanese computer scientist Hiroji 
Nishino.22 This meant, above all, demonstrating their mutual superiority 
over national or ideological narrow-mindedness. Just as the British computer 
scientist Richard Goodman congratulated him on the success o f Gagarin’s 
manned orbital flight, Ershov commiserated with his American colleagues 1920
19 EA f. 23, p. 150; f. 550, p. 89.
20 On this correspondence in particular, see Ksenia Tatarchenko, “ ‘Double Loyalties’ 
in Counterpoint: Computer Science from Silicon Valley to the Golden Valley,” in Trudy 
SORUCOM-2011, ed. A. N . Tomilin (Novgorod: Novgorodskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 
2011), 278—81. See also Tatarchenko, “Cold War Origins of the International Federation for 
Information Processing,” IEEE Annals o f the History of Computing 32, 2 (2010): 46—57, as well 
as the other articles in that issue.
21 Paul Edwards, The Closed World-: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War America 
(Cambridge, MA: M IT Press, 1996). Peter Galison has argued that early cybernetics was shot 
through with images o f a predictable, rational enemy drawn from the rhetoric of World War 
II (“The Ontology of the Enemy: Norbert Wiener and the Cybernetic Vision,” Critical Inquiry 
21, 1 [1994]: 228-66).
22 EA f. 128, p. 286, Ershov to Hiroji Nishino, 19 July 1973.
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after the assassination of John F. Kennedy.23 John McCarthy, not otherwise 
known for being a fellow-traveler, even entertained the idea—sincerely or 
not—that “Communism may well be a better system than capitalism, and 
the sooner it is achieved the sooner I will be able to see.”24 “It is indeed 
unfortunate that so much time is spent on emphasizing differences, and so 
little emphasizing similarities,” wrote the computer scientist Peter Ingerman 
after Ershov expressed similar sentiments. “Perhaps someday all politicians will 
become statesmen and will recognize the commonality o f human beings.”25 
Citizenship in the international scientific community did not just involve 
assertions o f commitment to transideological scientific ideals. It also meant 
being able to participate in creating, justifying, and maintaining long-lasting 
channels o f information exchange against a charged political background. 
often  this was framed directly in terms that linked communication to 
computer science, as when Feigenbaum expressed a hope that “soon I 
will be able to dial your computer directly, perhaps even through satellite 
communication.” “We seem to have established a communication channel 
which one all too rarely achieves in the world these days,” wrote another 
correspondent. “Long may it remain open and noise free.”26
Although such metaphorical language was common, generally the 
significance o f access to information was framed much more concretely. A 
majority o f Ershov’s incoming and outgoing foreign correspondence deals 
with requests for articles, books, and reprints or offers to establish more 
permanent exchange arrangements. For instance, in 1961 Ershov sent Carr 
a letter responding to his suggestion of “closer contacts” between Ershov’s 
group and the journal Computing Reviews (which Carr edited). He suggested 
that their “unofficial cooperation” take the form of a regular exchange of 
abstracts, books, and conference proceedings dealing with compiler and
23 EA f. 135, p. 256, Richard Goodman to Ershov, 15 April 1961 (English in orig.); f. 125, p. 
114, Ershov to Kazarinoff, 4 January 1964; f. 127, p. 95, Ershov to Paul Armer, 9 April 1968. 
See also, e.g., EA f. 127, p. 10, Ershov to Jacob Schwartz, 26 December 1968.
24 EA f. 133, p. 36, John McCarthy to Ershov, 15 October 1965 (English in orig.).
25 EA f. 131, p. 151, Peter Ingerman to Ershov, 9 May 1967. This form of “scientific 
internationalism” could intersect in uneasy ways with ideological questions. John Krige, 
American Hegemony and the Postwar Reconstruction of Science in Europe (Cambridge, MA: 
M IT Press, 2006), 153—90, demonstrates how a public dedication to openness and political 
impartiality provided justifications for excluding Soviet scientists, as avowedly partial, from 
the postwar scientific community. The Soviet insistence on compartmentalizing human-rights 
issues in an attempt to preserve scientific questions played a similar role. See also Paul Forman, 
“Scientific Internationalism and the Weimar Physicists,” Isis 64, 2 (1973): 150—80.
26 EA f. 133, pp. 8—11, Feigenbaum to Ershov, 8 November 1965; f. 122, p. 174, M. M. 
Lehman to Ershov, 16 December 1977 (English in orig.).
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language development.27 When Peter Naur decided to cease publication of the 
ALGOL Bulletin—which kept the worldwide scientific community informed 
about work being done on the language—Ershov fired ofl7 a letter o f protest, 
pointing out that “it played a major role for us, because only thanks to it 
could we, being located in the depths o f Siberia, feel ourselves in the midst of 
the events surrounding ALGOL’s development.”28 Just as his experiences in 
Akademgorodok led him to see the ideal scientist in terms o f methodological 
and informational rigor, Ershov’s international ties enmeshed him in a web of 
global information exchange defined through its universalistic commitment 
to science.
The link between these communities was realized concretely in the form 
o f enormous amounts o f foreign publications acquired with the help of 
Ershov’s Western contacts. One list o f such materials from a trip to the United 
States in 1970 covers 60 typewritten pages and includes nearly 500 items, 
from books and articles to advertisements and graduate-school bulletins.29 A 
brief 1983 “memo concerning the effectiveness o f the international scientific 
contacts o f Academy Corresponding Member A. P Ershov” assessed the value 
o f these links for Soviet computing in straightforward language:
The most direct indication of effectiveness is the material value of the 
scientific documentation received as a result of these contacts (reports, 
preprints, offprints, books, journals). Over the past eight years A. P. 
Ershov has received over 5,500 publications from abroad, valued at no 
fewer than 30,000 rubles in foreign currency. Most of the materials A. P. 
Ershov has received have come into the USSR in only a few copies or 
not at all. During the same period these materials have been lent out to 
over 600 scientific associates, including those from other cities, a total of 
around 20,000 times.27 8930
In the 1970s, when Ershov began to publicly develop his ideas about the hu­
man and social significance o f the exponentially increasing significance and 
distribution of information, he was not relying on vague futurological projec­
tions. His participation in global computer science gave him direct experi­
ence o f a global infosphere realized in material terms.
It was not, however, the elite and specialized scientific culture o f Soviet 
or international programmers that provided Ershov with his most direct 
point o f reference. Under the umbrella o f cybernetics, competing visions 
o f the social implications o f computing technology had been debated in
27 EA f. 124, p. 147, Ershov to Carr, 7 December 1961.
28 EA f. 124, p. 33, Ershov to Peter Naur, 1 August 1962.
29 EA f. 57, pp. 3-61.
30 EA f. 322, p. 144.
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the Soviet Union since the late 1940s. Slava Gerovitch’s From Newspeak 
to Cyberspeak has provided an exceptionally successful treatment o f these 
debates. Gerovitch traces the emergence o f cybernetics in the Soviet Union 
to the late Stalin period, when it was officially condemned and persecuted as 
a malignant foreign import. As Gerovitch shows, Soviet cybernetics began 
as a countercultural movement that aimed to give a common language to 
the sciences in opposition to the increasingly meaningless and malleable 
“Newspeak” o f dialectical materialism. In the 1950s, cybernetics—as the 
visiting Americans had noticed—exploded into public consciousness. In the 
pages o f the popular as well as the scientific press, the new science raised 
a number o f burning questions: could computers think, and what did this 
mean for human beings? How could computers and cybernetics be harnessed 
to solve scientific and technical problems? Most important, could the large- 
scale introduction of computers into the Soviet planned economy, combined 
with cybernetic analysis o f social feedback processes, hold the key to building 
a flourishing communist society?31
The Soviet leadership responded to the challenge o f cybernetics with 
enthusiasm. After a determined push by Admiral Aksel' Berg, one o f its 
earliest official supporters, cybernetics was assigned a key role in the 1961 
Communist Party Program. The authorities promoted far-reaching plans to 
set up multiple levels o f computer-based ASUs (Automated Control Systems) 
throughout the economy, starting with individual enterprises. The project— 
or rather projects, since multiple ministries began implementing their own 
networks— failed over and over again for several decades, in large part due 
to the resulting fragmentation.32 Meanwhile, the official stamp of approval 
given to cybernetics as an umbrella science meant that, already by the early 
1960s, it was seen as an all-purpose tool for total, computerized, “scientific” 
economic and social control; as its institutional significance grew, its 
scientific and practical effectiveness shrank, and the result was an ideological 
“CyberNewspeak” that replicated all the faults o f its Stalin-era predecessor.33
State recognition eventually introduced a duality into Soviet thinking 
about cybernetics. From the point o f view o f the Academy o f Sciences and 
the scientific community in general, it was still a scientific discipline with 312
31 Slava Gerovitch, From Newspeak to Cyberspeak: A History o f Soviet Cybernetics (Cambridge, 
MA: M IT Press, 2002); Graham, Science, Philosophy, and Human Behavior in the Soviet Union, 
266—92 . Francis Spufford’s unusual “non-fiction novel” Red Plenty (London: Faber and Faber, 
2010) offers an especially compelling treatment of this question.
32 Gerovitch, “InterNyet: Why the Soviet Union did not build a Nationwide Computer 
Network,” History and Technology 24, 4 (2008): 335—50.
33 Gerovitch, From Newspeak to Cyberspeak, 253—92.
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a relatively concrete, albeit expanded, portfolio: the generalized analysis 
o f feedback processes, primarily using mathematical and computational 
methods. Yet it also provided the Brezhnev era with a language with which to 
conceptualize the stability and authority o f sociopolitical structures, without 
sacrificing the emphasis on scientific and technical progress that continued to 
be a hallmark of official rhetoric.
As Gerovitch has pointed out, the work of the Soviet philosopher (and, 
after 1976, Pravda editor) V. G. Afanas'ev on “social information” provides 
an especially clear illustration of this theme. information had been one 
of the primary components o f cybernetics from the beginning, since the 
science’s basic premise is that systems adjust their functioning on the basis of 
feedback. A unit o f information became defined in this context as a “single 
decision between equally probable alternatives,” and information as such 
was contrasted to entropy. With the application o f cybernetic analysis to 
society, however, precise definitions became more difficult. Wiener proposed 
a model o f “group” or “communal” information based on observations and 
behavioral adjustments made by the members o f a group, linking it to the 
homeostasis o f small, natural communities.34 In 1975, Afanas'ev published 
Social Information and the Control o f Society, where he defined “social 
information” as “information circulating in society and used in the control 
o f social processes.” (The word “control” [upravlenie] was key for Soviet 
cyberneticians because o f the way it conflated a specialized cybernetic term 
with a word often emphasized by Lenin.) Unlike Wiener’s group information, 
social information was held to “carry the deep trace o f class, national, and 
other relations, the trace o f the needs, interests, and psychological traits o f the 
collective.”35 The 1970s Soviet adaptation ofWiener’s model involved an even 
more explicit merger o f normative and descriptive language.
This was why the “central place in the system of social information” was 
occupied by “political information,” which encompassed political relationships, 
organizations, and ideology (whether bourgeois or Marxist-Leninist). The 
political-information model envisioned a core—periphery relationship in 
which information about the masses’ “moral-political status, interests, needs, 
and mood” flowed inward to the Party, while knowledge, guidance, and 
propaganda flowed back outward.36 In an earlier essay, Afanas'ev had declared 
that one o f the main achievements o f cybernetics was its discovery that “control 3456
34 Wiener, Cybernetics, 11, 155—64.
35 Gerovitch, FromNewspeak to CyberSpeak, 254—87; V. G. Afanas'ev, Sotsial'naia informatsiia 
i upravlenie obshchestvom (Moscow: Politizdat, 1975), 39.
36 Afanas'ev, Sotsial'naia informatsiia, 354—98.
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has an essentially anti-entropie nature, and its calling is to counteract external 
and internal factors disturbing \vozmushchaiushchie\ to the system.”37
“Social information,” in other words, was meant to provide a cybernetic 
theory o f management for developed socialism—management in the business­
school sense o f the term. In recognition of the broad applicability o f his model, 
Afanas'ev was invited to serve as a management consultant for IBM after the 
publication of Social Information, an offer he refused in order to assume the 
editorship o f Fravda?37 8 39*On a practical level, one o f the most significant tasks of 
cybernetic management was to tame the “information explosion” and efficiently 
cope with the enormous and increasing amount o f bureaucratic paperwork, 
ultimately in order to convert “reference information” into “command 
information.” Afanas'ev emphasized the significance of ASUs, document 
standardization, and statistical computing. Although computers would be 
indispensable for all these tasks, they would be strictly ancillary. The central 
place would still be reserved for the human bureaucrat, whom he made no 
mention o f diminishing or displacing. Instead, he stressed the social importance 
and value o f “information-processing labor,” arguing that “in the final analysis 
all work with information is oriented toward the person in authority or the 
state organization \organ\ that makes the decision.” “Control,” he wrote, “is a 
uniquely elevated form of [specifically] human creativity.”39
Well before he had begun to write about social information, however, 
Afanas'ev was already thinking about the relationship between human beings 
and computers. In an apparently unpublished 1967 essay on “The ‘Human- 
Machine’ System in Automated Production,” he attempted to untangle the 
knot tying “social man” to his tools o f production in an environment where 
the tools themselves would be controlled by machines.40 For Afanas'ev, 
the relationship between the worker and the computer was fundamentally 
agonistic: computers were constantly running up against the limits o f the 
people assigned to them, causing either “information hunger” or “information 
overload.” “The operator’s activity,” he wrote, “does not always correspond to 
the demands o f the optimal flow of the process, its rapidity and precision. 
Between 20 and 58 percent o f control-system failures are connected with 
mistakes in the work o f the human operator.” To compensate for these defects, 
cybernetic devices were required to relieve the human being o f as much
37 Tsentral'nyi muzei-arkhiv lichnykh sobranii, Moscow (hereafter TsMAMLS) f. 2 (V. G. 
Afanas'ev), op. 1, d. 45, ll. 31—39.
38 Ibid., d. 79, ll. 36—38.
39 Afanas'ev, Chelovek v upravlenii obshchestvom (Moscow: Politizdat, 1977), 130—37; 
Afanas'ev, Sotsial'naia informatsiia, esp. 258—92, 306—17.
TsMAMLS f. 2, op. 1, d. 44, l. 1. This essay does not appear in Afanas'ev’s voluminous 
autobibliography (d. 79), so it almost certainly remained in draft form.
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responsibility for their operation as possible. Humans, meanwhile, were to 
undergo “comprehensive preparation for labor in conditions o f scientific- 
technological revolution and automated production,” inculcating “maximum 
flexibility, stamina, exceptional reaction speed, ‘interference immunity,’ the 
ability to rapidly change focus.” As in the case o f the creative bureaucrat, 
however, Afanas'ev’s argument here attempted to stake out a vague privileged 
ground of “creativity” and “intuition” that would not be susceptible to 
displacement by cybernetic machinery.41
Afanas'ev’s essay amounted to a rudimentary sketch o f a labor-force­
wide program o f computer education. Its basic assumptions, however, were 
fundamentally at odds with Ershov’s. Human—computer interaction, in 
the social-cybernetic view, could be envisioned only in rigidly instrumental 
terms; human beings needed to be “adapted” physically and psychologically 
to hostile machines; and, most important, human intuition and creativity was 
always defined in opposition to the encroaching capabilities o f computers, so 
that the two could never overlap. Remarkably, Afanas'ev articulated almost 
the same position—occasionally reusing identical arguments word-for- 
word, with minor vocabulary adjustments—in an article written in 1991, 
concluding with the line “Unto technology the things that are technological, 
unto man the things that are human.”42
it was against this background that Ershov’s utopian ideas began to 
develop. Over the course o f his career—and especially in the 1970s and 
1980s—he articulated an evolving vision o f “informatics” (informatika), a 
term that he did not invent but to which he gave a broad and far-reaching 
interpretation. In a 1984 article, he traced the initial appearance o f the word to 
the mid-1960s, when it was used either as a direct borrowing from the French 
term for “computer science” (informatique) or as a Latin-based neologism 
denoting the study o f scientific information. But the large-scale diffusion and 
broad redefinition of the term, in his view, did not take place until the 1976 
publication of the Russian translation, from the German, o f F. L. Bauer’s 
Informatik. Only then did it come to mean a “basic natural science dealing 
with processes o f information transmission and processing.” The article did 
not mention that Ershov had not only had a direct hand in getting Bauer’s 
work into print but was also its official editor.43 By 1988, Ershov was chairing 4123
41 Ibid., d. 44.
42 Afanas'ev, “Chelovek, komp'iuter, tvorchestvo,” Sovetskaia pedagogika, no. 5 (1991): 
50—56.
43 EA f. 267, p. 166, A. P. Ershov, “O predmete informatiki,” Vestnik A N  SSSR, no. 2 
(1984); f. 128, p. 319, Ershov to F. L. Bauer, 2 May 1973; f. 122, p. 400, Bauer to Ershov, 2 
February 1977. See also Yu. Chiorny, “On Notion of Informatics in Works of Academician 
Ershov,” in Trudy SORUCOM-2011, 341—49. Chiorny points out that it was through a willful
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the Council on Cybernetics while suggesting that informatics had “in a way 
taken over” the old field’s functional domain—“but we are not attempting to 
change either the name of the Council on Cybernetics or the traditions o f its 
first chairman, Aksel' Ivanovich Berg.”44 Like cybernetics, informatics had 
both a technical and a speculative meaning; even Afanas'ev could describe 
himself as an informaticist in the former sense, though his refusal to sign on 
to a program like Ershov’s meant he could not be one in the latter.
Informatics in the speculative sense was defined, above all, as the domain 
o f a specific kind of person. Already in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Ershov 
had begun to draw attention to the need to train an increasing number of 
programmers if officially declared plans to cyberneticize the economy and 
close the systems gap were ever to succeed. In 1970, he highlighted the urgency 
o f the issue in an article in Pravda.4  But programming education was much 
more than a public policy problem. It implied and required the creation of 
individuals with particular kinds o f personalities, capabilities, and worldviews. 
In a talk titled “Where Do People Who Can Produce Reliable Software Come 
From?” presented at a conference in Los Angeles in 1975, Ershov enumerated 
a number o f qualities, all o f which programmers needed to possess “in their 
extreme manifestation.” They included the “ability to seize the essence o f the 
matter,” as well as logical thinking, patience, discipline, and an ability to plan 
one’s activity. The education of such people demanded a seven- to eight-year 
course o f training that would unite high-level mathematics with “professional 
perfection” and an “engineer’s orientation toward productive results.”46 This 
complex o f ideal qualities was profoundly influenced by Ershov’s experiences 
in Akademgorodok and as an international computer scientist, spheres in 
which these attributes were valued above all else. Soon Ershov would come to 
see all these qualities as facets o f algorithmic thinking.
If the coming age was to be dominated by algorithmic machines, 
programmers, because o f their mastery o f algorithmic thinking, would come 
to occupy a uniquely central place in society. Ershov developed this idea most 
fully in a keynote address to the Spring Joint Computer Conference in Atlantic 
City in May 1972. Titled “Aesthetics and the Human Factor in Programing,”
misinterpretation of the French and German terms that Ershov brought two distinct forms of 
“ informatics” into being in the Soviet Union: one focused on information strictly speaking, 
the other on computing. These correspond in a general sense to the two categories I point to 
here, although “computing informatics” does not capture the utopian overtones of his usage.
44 EA f. боб, p. 345, Andrei Illarionov, “Gost' 13-i stranitsy: Akademik Andrei Ershov,” 
Nedelia, no. 38 (1988).
45 EA f. 342, pp. 272—85, A. P Ershov, “EVM—kompleks problem,” Pravda, 9 April 1970; f. 
350, pp. 1-2; f. 347, pp. 344-87.
46 EA f. 550, pp. 25—31.
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it was reprinted in at least five American publications and subsequently cited 
by Frederick Brooks, Jr., in his legendary book The Mythical Man-Month.4  
The speech suggests that programming is “the most humanly difficult of 
all professions involving numbers o f men,” not only because “programers 
constitute the first large group of men whose work brings them to those 
limits o f human knowledge which are marked by algorithmically unsolvable 
problems and which touch upon deeply secret aspects o f the human brain,” 
but also because the programmer “must join the accuracy of a bank clerk 
with the acumen of a scout, and to these add the powers o f fantasy o f an 
author o f detective stories and the sober practicality o f a businessman.”47 8 
The programmer’s privileged status affords him “both intellectual and vivid 
emotional satisfaction” based on the “rich, deep, and novel esthetic principles” 
o f his craft. After exploring the sources o f this satisfaction, Ershov delivers the 
crowning analogy:
The progressive expansion of software is, it seems to me, comparable 
in many ways to the phenomena set in motion by the invention of 
printing. The accumulation of books, each one embodying its author’s 
view of the external world, broadened a social process of understanding. 
in the same way, programs and data banks accumulate informational
and operational models of the world__To be a good programer today
is as much a privilege as it was to be a literate man in the 16th century.49
Ershov was not a crude technological determinist. His ideal o f the 
programmer, as he saw it in the mid-1970s, required social developments— 
dramatically expanding horizons o f information access and distribution—to 
go hand-in-hand with technological ones. His ideal was no longer simply 
professional: it was founded on a more fundamental claim about the 
programmer’s citizenship in a new kind o f society. As he concluded his speech, 
Ershov referenced the educational ideas o f Marvin Minsky and seymour 
Papert and asked if “the highest esthetic ideal o f our profession” was not “to 
make the art o f programing public property, and thereby to submerge our 
aesthetic exclusiveness within a mature mankind.” Although he sketched out 
an analogy to “general literacy,” however, his proposals remained unspecific.50
47 Kraineva, “Nauchnaia biografiia,” 254; Frederick P Brooks, Jr., The Mythical Man-Month 
(Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 179 n. 1.
48 A. P. Ershov, “Aesthetics and the Human Factor in Programing,” Jurimetrics Journal 13, 3 
(1973): 142—49. I have used the spelling “programing, programer” in direct quotations from 
this version of the speech, but Ershov himself seems to have used the standard spelling.
49 Ershov, “Aesthetics and the Human Factor,” 146.
50 Ibid., 148.
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Ershov’s ideas about the relationship between general education and 
computer technology were, in fact, closely shaped by contemporary Western 
developments, which he was able to learn about through his network of foreign 
contacts. Ershov’s general preoccupation with human-machine interaction 
led him to correspond with Edward Feigenbaum and John McCarthy about 
new technologies for computer-aided instruction being developed in the 
United States in the mid-1960s.51 Among the many titles Ershov brought 
back from the United States with him in 1970 were descriptions o f PLATO, 
a pathbreaking early attempt at an integrated, graphical computer system 
for education. By far the greatest influence, however, seems to have been 
exerted by Seymour Papert, an M IT professor whom he met during that 
trip.52 Papert’s ideas, which became broadly popular in the 1970s and 1980s, 
focused on the computer’s potential to develop untapped human abilities 
and “help people form new relationships with knowledge that cut across the 
traditional lines separating humanities from sciences and knowledge o f the 
self from both of these.” He opposed the traditional model o f computer- 
aided instruction, in which “the computer programs the child”  to one in which 
“the child programs the computer”  Children, in Papert’s view, were to be given 
the opportunity to experiment independently with simple programming 
languages like LO G O  (which he invented in 1967) to accomplish limited 
tasks in a restricted environment, a practice that would help them develop 
algorithmic thinking and an openness to mathematics.53
While Papert’s thinking proved vital for Ershov, perhaps even more 
important was the emergence o f the microprocessor-based personal computer 
(PC) in the second half o f the 1970s. Hardly any PCs were produced in 
the Soviet Union before the end of the 1980s, but Ershov was nonetheless 
aware o f their epochal significance. “The concept o f the personal computer,” 
Ershov wrote in 1983, “broke up many of the established directions of 
computer technology and programming, revealed a number o f growing 
contradictions in the development o f computing, and placed new characters
on the stage__  The PC, it seems, is returning to the programming and
usage o f computers the integrity that _  was carefully being destroyed by
51 See, e.g., EA f. 126, pp. 59—63, Ershov to McCarthy, 28 June 1966; and f. 133, pp. 174— 
75, Feigenbaum to Ershov, 22 December 1965.
52 EA f. 57, p. 13. (Papert wore Ershov’s badge during a 1966 conference, but they did not 
know each other at the time. See EA f. 132, pp. 147—53, McCarthy to Ershov, 10 May 1966.)
53 Seymour Papert, Mindstorms: Children, Computers, and Powerful Ideas (New York: Basic 
Books, 1980), 3—18. Italics in orig. For a classic account of the psychological effects of 
computers—and of Papert’s ideas in particular—see Sherry Turkle, The Second Self: Computers 
and the Human Spirit (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984).
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the grandees [korifei] o f professional programming.”54 The personal computer 
was not only transforming programming by creating a whole new class of 
programmers whose principal client was themselves; it was also changing 
society by imposing new computer skill requirements and providing the 
means o f addressing them. For instance, the large-scale use o f microprocessor- 
based systems would enable the automatization and dramatic reduction of 
bureaucratic white-collar work.55 Specifically in the educational context, the 
personal computer held tremendous significance because it could both bring 
informational-computational power and visual displays directly to student 
desks and provide students with more developed, interactive “world models.”56
Personal computers led Ershov to recapitulate his analogy to the history 
o f reading, moving the parallel forward into the age o f mass literacy. Where 
before his story focused on the unique privileges available to the literate 
person—the programmer—at the dawn o f the Gutenberg era, now he stressed 
the “interdependence o f the development o f book printing and the universal 
literacy it required.” Like printed books, personal and embedded processors 
would serve to catalyze a mass public for whom universal education in 
programming would take the place o f literacy. Not only would this lead 
to new modes o f appreciating and using information; it would also give 
children an “active life position”—that is, the “ability to develop a program 
o f action and follow it”—as well as “accelerate their intellectual ripening” by 
helping them develop algorithmic thinking and the capacity for reflection 
and abstraction. in short, the future o f education as Ershov saw it would 
involve the training o f everyone in those qualities that he had long considered 
necessary for an ideal programmer. The emergence o f the personal computer 
would democratize the skills and qualities o f this new intellectual elite. Like 
books, computers were the bearers o f a transformative new “informational 
model o f the external world.”57 Over the course o f the 1970s, Ershov had gone 
from making a narrowly technical claim about the training o f programmers 
to an all-encompassing vision o f the information age that was opposed, both 
substantively and rhetorically, to the language o f control and discipline that 
dominated soviet cybernetics.
Ershov’s growing engagement with questions o f significance to a broader 
public was in part the result o f his increasing stature in the world o f Soviet 
programming. In 1970, he was made a corresponding member o f the 5467
54 EA f. 209, pp. 322-36.
55 A. P. Ershov, “Dva oblika programmirovaniia,” in Izbrannye trudy, 309—13; EA f. 498, pp. 
329-42.
56 EA f. 281, p. 9.
57 A. P Ershov, “Programmirovanie— vtoraia gramotnost,” in Izbrannye trudy, 32—40.
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Academy of Sciences, and from this period on, he began to play an active role 
in editing computer-science journals, organizing union-wide conferences, and 
serving on government commissions.58 In 1979, he published a pamphlet on 
“school informatics” with two o f his colleagues. This framed the somewhat ill- 
defined ideas o f his Atlantic City speech in terms of the concrete actions and 
structures that needed to be put in place to informatize the Soviet educational 
system—a process envisioned as gradual and evolutionary. They included 
the development o f an appropriate educational computer language along 
the lines o f LOGO , as well as databases and hardware. New textbooks were 
also needed, because the existing ones failed to appreciate the significance of 
information processing and treated the computer as a glorified calculator.59 
Meanwhile, Ershov began to write and publish articles about educational 
computing in the popular press, which were intended to demonstrate to the 
broader reader that programming instruction was a necessity, not a luxury.60
Although his efforts to promote an evolutionary model o f school 
informatics gained the support o f state and party authorities, by 1985 it was 
clear to Ershov that the “infiltrationist model,” as he called it, had failed: 
“It turned out that this strategy was incapable o f overcoming inertia and an 
inadequate level o f social consciousness, as well as the subsequently revealed 
‘braking mechanism’ o f social development in general.” A “frontal assault” 
was now needed. At any rate, in late 1984 (after Ershov had become a full 
member o f the academy), the Ministry o f Education, after considerable work 
on the part o f Ershov and others, ordered that a course on “Foundations 
o f Informatics and Computing Technology” be introduced in all ninth and 
tenth grade classes everywhere in the Soviet Union the very next school year. 
This was not enough, however: a “firm” and “abrupt” “political decision” was 
going to be necessary. Ershov appealed to the Politburo, which decreed an 
even more large-scale deployment o f school informatics on 9 March 1985. 
Gorbachev himself wrote the mandate.61 58960*
58 Kraineva, “Nauchnaia biografiia,” 97—164.
59 A. P. Ershov et al., eds., Shkol'naia informatika: Kontseptsii, sostoianie, perspektivy 
(Novosibirsk: Vychislitelnyi tsentr Sibirskogo otdeleniia Rossiiskoi akademii nauk, 1979); EA 
f. 167, pp. 156-83.
60 EA f. 155, pp. 13—18, A. P Ershov, “EVM v mire liudei,” Sovetskaia kul'tura, 14 April 
1985; f. 209, p. 25, Ershov, “Chelovek i komp iuter,” Izvestiia, 2 February 1984.
EA f. 280, pp. 21—34. The most comprehensive overview of the program, which situates 
the computer literacy program in the context of the more general 1980s school reform effort 
as well as analogous projects in other countries, is Stephen T. Kerr, “Educational Reform and 
Technological Change: Computing Literacy in the Soviet Union,” Comparative Education 
Review 35, 2 (1991): 222—54; see also Richard Judy and Jane Lommel, “The New Soviet 
Computer Literacy Campaign,” Educational Communication and Technology 34, 2 (1986): 
108—23.
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Ershov offered his most comprehensive defense o f his vision for the 
computer literacy program in the Kommunist article quoted at the beginning 
o f this essay. “Informatization: From the Computer Literacy o f Students 
to the Information Culture o f Society” was published in 1988—the year of 
his death. In it, he argued that computerization was not only necessary if 
the U SSR was to succeed in the 21st century but an eminently achievable 
goal. Although Ershov acknowledged the present limits to the growth of the 
information sector in the Soviet Union, he saw in it unlimited potential. 
Personal computers would dramatically reduce the need for bureaucrats and 
white-collar workers, thereby unlocking the power o f private creative initiative 
and fostering the “democratization of the information structure o f society”—a 
formula that suggested Ershov was adapting informatics to perestroika much 
as cybernetics had been adapted to developed socialism. But informatization 
entailed more than mere short-term social changes; it represented nothing 
less than a cognitive watershed for human civilization as a whole. Here lay the 
unique advantage o f the Soviet system, for “even by virtue o f its design, the 
socialist society has the ability to realize the social function of informatization 
gradually and harmoniously through its educational institutions.”62 The 
computer literacy program, in Ershov’s view, was both aligned with the goals 
o f perestroika and fundamental for realizing his utopian vision.
The program launched on schedule, after a rapid crash course for 
teachers, using a provisional textbook authored by Ershov and his Novosibirsk 
colleagues. One o f the major difficulties became apparent immediately: the 
Soviet Union simply lacked the numbers o f personal computers required 
to make a nationwide effort reasonable. Although multiple ministries—  
including the Ministry o f Radio Manufacturing, the Ministry o f Electronic 
Manufacturing, and others—had submitted proposals for their hardware to 
be used, all had serious deficiencies and no ministry was capable o f delivering 
computers in sufficient quantities. A considerable number o f Yamaha 
machines were imported to compensate, but they were too expensive and their 
numbers were insufficient.63 Since even Moscow schools were undersupplied, 
and the situation in rural areas and in less developed republics was downright 
catastrophic, some alternative way of fulfilling the mandate had to be found.
In the vast majority o f Soviet schools, the computer literacy course was 
taught without computers. Although Ershov himself always insisted on the 
importance o f putting students into direct contact with PCs, this basic lack 623
62 A. P Ershov, “Informatizatsiia: Ot komp iuternoi gramotnosti uchashchikhsia k 
informatsionnoi kulture obshchestva,” in Izbrannye trudy, 371—84.
63 Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF) f. R-9563 (Ministerstvo 
prosveshcheniia SSSR), op. 1, d. 4910.
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actually seemed to dovetail with a key aspect o f his educational program: 
training in algorithmic thinking, the key skill o f citizens in the age of 
informatization. In addition to a large body o f material on the social and 
economic significance o f computers, the “machineless variant” implied that 
students could be taught algorithm construction (using a form of notation 
similar to computer code) without ever seeing a screen. Predictably enough, 
student interest in the course declined by 80 percent once it was discovered 
that no computers or even real computer languages were actually involved— 
although students at schools with computer labs also lost interest. Part o f the 
problem may have been that provisional sanitary (i.e., ergonomic) guidelines 
established by the Ministry o f Health limited schoolchildren to 20 minutes 
o f computer time a week.64
Even more seriously for Ershov’s vision, the Ministry o f Education and the 
commission charged with implementing the informatics course (headed by 
Evgenii Velikhov) took aim directly at the cornerstone o f the whole concept. 
In December 1986, it offered three basic criticisms o f Ershov’s provisional 
textbook. First, it was “overloaded with material unnecessary for a general 
education school and more appropriate for pre-professional programming 
training.” Second, it failed to emphasize interdisciplinary connections beyond 
physics and mathematics. Finally, it “fails to sufficiently clarify the concept of 
‘information’—one of the key concepts o f the new subject.” In contrast, the 
commission proposed that the course focus on skills that would be directly 
useful to students in a practical context, and specifically not train them to be 
programmers. “It should be kept in mind,” one o f its theses suggested, “that 
the majority o f secondary-school graduates will have contact with computers 
only in an end-user capacity, if at all, while the tendency is for computers to 
become easier to use, thus requiring fewer programming skills.”65
Ershov registered his objections to this evaluation in an article in 
Uchitel'skaia gazeta two months later. Information could not be defined 
through an “isolated piece o f reasoning”; it had to “interpenetrate the whole 
fabric o f the textbook.” For their part, “algorithmization and programming ... 
make up the lion’s share o f the intellectual effort involved in solving problems 
on a computer. The structure o f this process, its knowledge and skill-building 
role, cannot be replaced by any ‘pushbutton’ application of a readymade
program-product__  The course cannot be deprived of this creative core,
which serves as an axis for all the other components o f information culture.”66 
Without a rigorous, quasi-professional, and universal course o f programming
64 Ibid., op. 2, d. 734, ll. 4-6; op. 1, d. 5483, l. 24.
65 Ibid., op. 2, d. 734, ll. 1-7.
66 A. P Ershov, “Prosto—‘Informatika,’ ” Uchitel'skaia gazeta, 16 February 1987.
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training, the information age he imagined would be left without an active 
citizenry.
Other criticisms were both more direct and more severe. One review 
o f Ershov’s text expressed incredulity that he could have been responsible 
for such a poorly organized and undeveloped product and suggested that he 
had never actually read it.67 In another, the prominent computer scientist 
S. S. Lavrov claimed that “ [o]nly a short time ago, based on my 30 years 
o f experience developing computer programs ... I would have suggested a 
[computer literacy] program project similar in structure to that developed 
by Academician A. P. Ershov.” But new trends in the use o f computers, 
centered on the usage o f readymade programs by masses o f office workers, 
were rendering the universal teaching of programming and algorithms 
obsolete.68 I. I. Logvinov agreed with Lavrov and challenged the premise 
that Ershov’s course structure could ever inculcate algorithmic thinking 
in the first place. “The basic psychological structures that characterize the 
general mental development o f a person complete their formation by the 
age o f 15,” he wrote. ”Any, even the most progressive, form of reinforcement 
and establishment o f skills and habits demands a certain amount o f time, 
which cannot be arbitrarily reduced.” Given the amount o f material packed 
into the course, and its often scattershot presentation, his prognosis was not 
optimistic—as the unimpressive classroom results soon bore out.69
In short, Ershov demanded too much ofhis students. His ideas, democratic 
and utopian though they were, were unable to coexist with a world o f mass 
computing in which elite scientific culture no longer had the aspirational 
appeal it once did. Combined with the lack o f computers, Ershov’s narrowly 
algorithmic and professional horizons consigned the educational reform to 
irrelevance. The 1988 revision of the textbook halved the algorithm section, 
gave narrowly encyclopedic definitions o f “information,” and removed most 
o f the advanced material.70 Ershov died on 8 December o f that year; although 
he left no detailed attempt to take stock o f the disaster, it was clear that mass 
computer literacy, as he had once envisioned it, was not a going concern.
The course was not the only component o f the informatics campaign, 
however. In fact, a reviewer o f a text for an “in-depth” version of the textbook 
had observed bluntly that no attempt at in-depth informatics teaching could 
succeed in a formal classroom setting: “It is pointless for the simple reason that 
teachers who have studied all the included sections in depth and are capable 67890
67 GARF f. R-9563, op. 2, d. 735, ll. 44-48.
68 Ibid., d. 783, ll. 17-19.
69 Ibid., op. 1, d. 5483, ll. 19-25.
70 Ibid., op. 2, d. 796, l. 20.
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o f translating them to the level o f schoolchildren do not exist__Talented
and curious schoolchildren will find an opportunity to satisfy their ambitions 
through the network o f computer clubs, pioneer palaces, extracurricular clubs, 
[etc.].”71 In fact, a major conference about the computer literacy campaign, 
held in April 1986, recommended that informal leisure spaces such as pioneer 
palaces, as well as popular-science publications, be leveraged on a broad scale 
to promote extracurricular informatics instruction. Such initiatives had 
already been implemented from the beginning of the campaign.72
o n e  publication enrolled in this extracurricular push was the Soviet 
Union’s leading popular science magazine, Nauka i zhizn', In June 1985, 
it announced a new section, “The School for Beginning Programmers.” In a 
series o f  several dozen lessons, it would teach computer enthusiasts among the 
magazine’s readership to program, starting with the basics; other new sections 
would provide them with a forum to send in letters, submit humorous 
computing-related stories, and exchange programming tips. Unlike the 
formal course, the magazine series did not limit itself to computers: in an 
attempt to reach the broadest possible audience, it focused initially on the 
widely available Elektronika-brand programmable calculators.73 The magazine 
Kvant, in which Ershov had begun to publish articles on programming 
in 1979, later motivated this choice specifically in relation to computer- 
literacy education: “Niklaus Wirth ... believes that educating all children 
in computer literacy up to the level o f highly qualified programmers would 
be an unrealistic and short-sighted goal. But exposing as many children as 
possible to the possibilities o f computers and programs is necessary, and the 
earlier the better. We would only add that the cheaper, more widely available, 
simple, and safe the devices are, the more reasonable [this goal] is.”74
Although these lessons may have had low technological barriers for entry, 
this did not mean the subject matter was dumbed down. The practice problems 
often involved advanced mathematical concepts, and the emphasis was on 
exploiting the machine’s limited capabilities to produce unexpected results. 
Many of the suggestions required modifying the hardware: for instance, 
rewiring the circuit board with a soldering iron. Other articles introduced 
readers to technological innovations created overseas and discussed the details
71 Ibid., d. 783, ll. 122-23.
72 Ibid., op. 1, d. 5296.
73 G. Slavin, “Shkola nachinaiushchego programmista,” Nauka i zhizn', no. 6 (1985): 33—43.
74 V. Tarasenko, “Algoritmika prostoty,” Kvant, no. 8 (1991): 74. Wirth, who taught in 
Switzerland and California, was the designer of Pascal and other important programming 
languages.
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o f government plans for computer manufacturing.75 Later, Kvant invited its 
readers to create their own versions o f Tetris by working around the severe 
limitations o f programmable calculators.76
In December 1987, Nauka i zhizn', as part o f an attempt to engage its 
readers in dialogue, published a letter from a reader that tried to make sense o f 
the section’s audience o f amateurs. “Computer sections in popular-scientific
magazines are multiplying like mushrooms after the rain__Yet the common
feature o f all these publications is their total lack o f an authorial stance. it 
is impossible to tell to whom this or that bit o f material is being addressed, 
it’s unclear what the author wants from his addressee and why.” The author 
divided readers into four groups: amateur programmers, potential computer 
users, hobbyists—“who need to play with some kind of object to relax”—and 
people who read anything and everything. (They asked pointed questions, 
including “Who is playing the leading role in the current comedy with the 
school computers?”—a reference to the struggles o f Ershov’s computer literacy 
initiative.) Kvant, meanwhile, trumpeted the fact that it was read by everyone 
“from fifth-graders to pensioners,” and one issue was read on average by five 
different people. It saw itself specifically as cultivating the ability o f readers 
to transition “from an informally formulated problem to an algorithm.”77 
The tenacity o f the computer sections and the proliferation of the genre all 
over the popular press testifies to the emergence in the Soviet Union of a 
nascent culture o f computer hobbyists, accustomed to algorithmic thinking 
as well as free-range experimentation. Unlike school informatics, they seem 
to have fulfilled at least something o f the promise Ershov envisioned for his 
educational project, though they would never measure up to the standards he 
had once set.
The irony o f Ershov’s vision, therefore, was that a set o f ideals and 
expectations he originally developed within the narrow context o f professional 
scientific elites ended up partially succeeding only among a public o f amateurs, 
most o f whom did not even own the personal computers Ershov saw as a sine 
qua non. As a blueprint for generalized, state-organized social transformation, 
his project was a dramatic failure; and the information age was now definitively 
seen in terms of ordinary people using, rather than programming, computers.78 7568
75 V. Kudriavtsev, “V  dvukh rezhimakh,” Nauka i zhizn', no. 6 (1989): 105; “Personalnyi 
kompiuter: Chto, gde, kogda?” Nauka i zhizn ', no. 12 (1987): 18—24. This kind of amateur 
technological culture had a long ancestry in the Soviet Union. See Stephen Lovell, “How 
Russia Learned to Listen: Radio and the Making of Soviet Culture,” Kritika 12, 3 (2011): 
591-615.
76 A. Kotova, “Vokrug ‘Tetrisa,’ ” Kvant, no. 12 (1992): 49—51.
77 A. N. Vilenkin, “Kto i kak chitaet Kvant,” Kvant, no. 11 (1988): 89.
78 See, e.g, A. Silin, “Vek informatiki,” Nauka i zhizn ', no. 2 (1989): 28—33.
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Yet at the individual level, Ershov’s ideas about the cognitive and social 
implications o f mass programming still left an imprint on Soviet and post­
Soviet computer culture. It is tempting, in fact, to suggest that the hackers 
and malware-creators for whom the Russian computing scene is known today 
are oöshoots o f late Soviet amateur computer culture: the first internationally 
known Russian computer hacker, Vladimir Levin, who stole over $12 million 
from Citibank in 1994, was one of these self-taught hobbyists.79
In short, the information society that emerged in the 1990s looked 
nothing like the “informatized” USSR Ershov had envisioned by the time of 
his death, even if personal computing proved to be every bit as transformative 
as he had imagined. Yet to see this in terms of prescience or lack thereof would 
be to miss the point. Ershov’s vision of an infosphere dominated by liberated 
users with the algorithmic minds o f professionals was the product not o f 
well-informed forecasting but o f an ideology shaped against the background 
o f the Khrushchev-era boom in interest and investment in science whose 
fruits included Akademgorodok as well as official cybernetics. It had little to 
say about the world o f actually existing computing, no matter how closely 
it was tied in with official policies on informatization. For all the talk of 
“accelerating progress,” then, Ershov and the scientific-technical vision of the 
early perestroika years was looking backward, not forward. Caught up with 
responding to the challenges o f the 1970s, it proved ill-adapted to the more 
disruptive realities o f the 1990s. Reconciling the information economy with 
the urgent demands o f reform would not be so straightforward a task.
Dept. o f History 
Robinson Hall 
Harvard University 
35 Quincy St.
Cambridge, MA 02138 USA 
afinogen@fas.harvard.edu
79 Ggoneky 8 February 1999, 40—47.
